

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 17.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1811.

[Price 1s.]

"The officers of the army may depend upon it, that the enemy, to whom they are opposed, are not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding *what has been printed in GAZETTES and NEWSPAPERS*, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons."—(Signed) WELLINGTON. —Circular Letter to the Officers of the English Army in Portugal, which see in another part of this Number.

513]

[514

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS.—In my last, at page 490, I broke off this subject abruptly, because there was not room for the whole of my Article, without dividing the *Plan of the Spanish Constitution*, which I wished to avoid by all means.—Before I resume it, I think it necessary to refer to a passage, published in the Register of the 20th of July last, and to which passage, I am informed, an interpretation has been given, which I am sure it does not bear, and which I well know not to have been my meaning. It relates to Lord Wellington, and after noticing, that his brother had lately called him a "*dis-tinguished warrior*," it proceeds thus:—"If he be not, it shall not, if I live, be for want of one to give, and put upon record, a full account of all his operations: not a lying account; not a hire-ling account; not a base and abominable string of frauds upon the people of England, which serve to cheat some of them and to furnish others of them with excuses for their villainies, but, which, so far from deceiving the rest of the world, are the scorn and contempt of all foreign nations; not an account of this sort, but a *true* account; an account which will place all the actors, on both sides, in their proper light; that will hold up the skilful and the brave to the admiration of posterity, that will show what misfortunes, disgraces, and miseries proceed from putting power in the hands of a *fat-headed fool*, and that will damn to everlasting infamy those who have sought to disguise their cowardice by the means of blustering and lies, be they on which side they may."—The words in *italics* have, I am informed, been, by some persons, and those pretty closely interested in the matter, represented as intended to apply to Lord Wellington. Now, not only did I not mean so to apply them; but, they do not, in

any way that they can be viewed, bear that construction. They have no reference to him at all; they do not point at him, but, on the contrary, they point, if they point at all, *away* from him, he, as it is well known to me as well as to all who ever saw him, being, not a *fat-headed* but a *lean-headed* man. However, notwithstanding the evident marks of the non-application of the words, I have no scruple solemnly to declare, *that I had him not in my eye in using them; that I did not mean him; and that I never either heard him called, or called him, or thought him, a fool, in my life.*—From the beginning of the war in Portugal I have been endeavouring to guard the public against the falsehoods, the endless falsehoods of the venal press; and, I have several times observed, that this press, while it was incessantly extolling the General, was, in fact, doing its best to demolish his reputation, by *swelling out his numbers*, and by *diminishing the force of the enemy* and speaking contemptuously of that enemy. It is curious enough, that those representations of mine should, at last, have been seconded by the General himself: whether the venal crew will pay more attention to him than to me I cannot say; but, I should not be much surprised, if they were now to turn round upon him and retract all their former extravagant praises.—The Circular, from which I take my motto, has appeared in all the London newspapers, and has evidently been inserted by pretty good authority. With regard to the censure it contains on Col. COCHRANE, the censure is not very harsh, and the offence is one which will always be looked at with a very lenient eye. Over-zeal and unrestrainable courage, though they may sometimes be productive of loss, are, upon many occasions, the very things which are decisive of victory.—The mention of the marvellous "*stories*," that is to say, *lies*, which "*all have read*," in *Gazettes and newspapers*, is very important. He, pro-

bably, alludes to the *Gazette* in Portugal; but, as to *news-papers*, he must have our *Courier* and *Morning Post*, and others of our prints, in his eye; and herein he confirms my repeated complaints against them. This is, on his part, an act of self-defence, and the same in behalf of his army; for, if these "*stories*" were believed, how were the public to account for the continuation of the war? How were the public to avoid being surprized, that the French were not wholly defeated and chased out of the Peninsula long ago? But, this inference from such "*stories*" fell particularly heavy upon the reputation of our Commander; for, if it were true, that whole armies of the enemy were to be driven back by detachments of our Light Infantry or Dragoons, how was he to answer to his country for retreating, at any time, or under any circumstances, before that same enemy?—The *Courier*, perceiving how this circular letter bore upon him, had, as I thought, kept it wholly out of his columns; but, upon looking at the *back* of the paper, I found it crammed in there, where, of course, it would escape the observation of the greater part of his readers. This trick is well worthy of observation. The document was the most important that has come from Portugal for a long while, as containing very useful information; as containing an expression of our *Commander's opinion of the enemy*; and, as containing his official protest against the exaggerated accounts published in this country; and yet, this very document the *Courier* crams into a back page, usually, and, indeed, always, appropriated to articles upon which the Editor sets the least value, and which he does, in fact, put in generally as mere matter *to fill up with*. But, to publish the document was to promulgate his own shame; it was to promulgate Lord Wellington's condemnation of what I had so often condemned. —Indeed, if this writer of the *Courier* and many others, had met together and deliberated upon a plan for the real destruction of the reputation of the man, on whom they were lavishing the most extravagant encomiums, they could not have acted otherwise than they have done. *Before* a battle they have always given him a superiority of numbers; they have invariably represented him as amply supplied with every thing; they have always greatly diminished the number of his sick; they have fabricated "let-

ters from the army" contradicting the reports of great prevalent sickness; they have denounced, as enemies to the country, those who gave true statements of the ravages of disease in our camps or garrisons; they have always had the army "in *high health and spirits*," even in the most sickly times; and, though last not least, they have constantly spoken of our army as having the cordial support of all the people of the Peninsula of every description. On the contrary, they have represented the French, *before* every approaching battle, as having inferior numbers; they have represented them, upon all occasions, as destitute of provisions and supplies of all sorts; they have told us that sickness and desertion were constantly making dreadful ravages amongst the enemy, and have, at times, reduced their numbers almost to nothing; and, never have they ceased to assert, that the whole of the inhabitants of the Peninsula detested and abhorred the French, and lost no opportunity of annoying them. —Well, now, if this was believed; and believed it must have been by a great majority of the public, in what a situation must that belief place our Commander and his army in the eyes of that public, when the latter saw, that, though advantages were occasionally gained, they were soon taken away again; and that, at almost every encounter, a retreat, or, at least, a retrograde movement, on our part, was the consequence? The premises point directly to the conclusion, and to the only possible conclusion, that was, and must have been, drawn by every man capable of reasoning. —And, with regard to the French, if these stories were believed, if it was believed that their numbers were always inferior, that they were destitute of supplies of all kinds, that they were wasting hourly with sickness, and that every one of the people had a knife ready for their throats; if all this was believed by the public, what must naturally have been the conclusion of that public, when they saw, that our army was still obliged to retreat before those French? —But, this has been the constant practice of the venal part of the English press from the commencement of the Anti-Jacobin war to this day, which press has always swelled out our own force *before* a battle, and diminished that of the enemy; it has always painted our prospects in the most flowery colours; and, observe, if any man has had the courage to endeavour to give a check to the san-

guine a
voured
reproach
his op
friend
nounced
wanted
as well
instance
part of
time wh
invade
that oc
with the
delivera
the rest
vernme
garded
represe
Mr. M
publish
avowed
his No.
"To a
"full o
"the la
"ing
"which
"a gre
"to th
"ment
"the S
"the B
"factic
"on th
"about
"by a
"Brut
"zerla
"polit
"of t
were t
the En
fated e
held f
ended
in Eng
that th
ten-fo
repres
pictur
Duke
consis
sian M
by, an
"Prin
his ed
stead
descri
"Eng

guine and fallacious hopes thus endeavoured to be excited, that man has been reproached with *wishes* corresponding with his opinions; he has been called the friend of the enemy; and, in short, denounced as a traitor in his heart, who only wanted the occasion to become so in act as well as in inclination. — A remarkable instance of this *hope-exciting* work, on the part of the English press, was seen at the time when the Duke of York was about to invade Holland in the year 1799. Upon that occasion the public prints teemed with the most confident predictions of the *deliverance* of the United Provinces and the restoration of the Stadtholderian Government, which, so far from being regarded as an enterprize of difficulty, was represented as a merely holiday march. Mr. MALLET DU PAN, who, at that time, published the British Mercury, under the avowed patronage of the ministry, said, in his No. of the 30th of September, 1799: "To an army of *forty-five thousand men*, full of emulation, from the general to the last soldier, to a squadron commanding the Zuyder Sea, to the support which there are hopes of obtaining from a great portion of the inhabitants, and to the ancient and unalterable attachment of the Dutch Regular Troops to the Stadtholder; to all these what do the Batavian Directory, the revolutionary faction, and their extravagant guardians on the banks of the Seine oppose? Why, about *twenty thousand French*, commanded by a *Printer's Boy of Limosin*; by that BRUNE who juggled and pillaged Switzerland; who received his military and political education in the tennis-courts of the French Revolution." — Such were the pictures that were exhibited to the English public at the out-fit of that ill-fated expedition; such were the prospects held forth to them. How that expedition ended we all know, and, though I was not in England at the time, I venture to say, that the public mortification was increased ten-fold by these flattering and fallacious representations. And, in what a light did pictures like this tend finally to place the Duke of York and the other commanders, consisting of numbers of English and Russian Noblemen; who were, at last, beaten by, and compelled to capitulate with, "a *Printer's Boy of Limosin*," who had had his education in a tennis court? — If, instead of giving the public this fallacious description, the writer had said: "The English and Russian army, though nu-

merous and brave, will have occasion to exercise all their force and all their skill; for, they have opposed to them twenty thousand, at least, of these same Frenchmen, who have conquered so many countries, and routed so many brave and well-disciplined armies, commanded by the greatest generals in Europe; and, these French troops, together with the Dutch, headed by the Patriots who were put down by the Stadtholder and the Prussians in 1787, are under the command of a man, whom nature formed for great exploits, and whom the soul-stirring Revolution of France has raised to the command of an army from being a Printer's boy at Limosin; a sure and certain sign, an infallible proof, that he is a man *not to be despised*." — Now, if this had been the language of the English press, at the time referred to, does not the reader see, that the disappointment of the nation, that the mortification, that the humiliation, which, at last, came upon it, would not have been nearly so great as they were? — Yes, he sees it very plainly; but, he also sees, that such language from the English press might not have had a tendency to render the Expedition very popular. Aye, there is the rub! In order to render the war popular; in order to excite hopes of its final success; with this view the means of the enemy are continually diminished, or kept wholly out of sight, while our own means are swelled very far beyond the truth. This may serve to keep the planners of wars and expeditions in countenance; but, is it, I ask, fair dealing with the army and its commanders? — To return, now, a little more closely to the subject before us, the numbers of our own army had, as I was observing in my last, been stated at 47,000 English Troops, and at 60,000 Portuguese, the greater part of whom was represented as being with or near our main army. What excuse then, with those who believed this statement, could there be for raising the blockade of Rodrigo at the approach of 60,000 of the enemy? Thus was the public left, by those venal writers, to draw a conclusion either most injurious to the reputation of our Commander or to the reputation of his army. — It is true, that these prints *praise him* still; they *applaud* what he has done; but, what is their praise worth, unless they were frankly to acknowledge, that what they before said of the strength of his army was totally false? Unless they were to do this,

their *opinions* are at war with their *facts*, and which are likely to have most weight I leave the public to judge.—They cannot now with any effect, unsay what they have said; for they would be believed by nobody; and, besides, they have other matters to attend to; they have to justify the *measures of the ministry*; they have to perform the task of making the nation believe, not only that the war is wise in itself, but that *care is taken to furnish ample means for carrying it on with success*. Here is the great difficulty. They must maintain this; and, to maintain this, and, at the same time, to justify the late movement of the General commanding, is a task far beyond their slender capacities. Hence it is, that they are continually sacrificing in effect, the military reputation of the General whom in words they are extolling to the skies. Nor is it the General who alone has ground of complaint against them: the whole army suffers in its character through these falshoods of the press; for, those sufferings, which would call forth the compassion of the nation, are kept wholly out of sight, and we are bid to believe, that the army, while suffering from sickness and from all sorts of privations, are in "*high health and spirits*," and are abundantly supplied with all sorts of necessities and comforts. What I have heard, and from very good authority; what I have heard from the lips of eye-witnesses, and what I have been informed of by letters, written by those whom I know to be incapable of falshood, would, if I were to state it, be treated as a malicious invention of my own. Indeed, I should be afraid to state it. But, I will say this, and which, indeed, I have said before, that, from every thing that I have heard, I do not believe, that we had a force actually fit for duty, half sufficient to face 60,000 men; and, if so, all the stories about the 47,000 British Troops, and the great numbers of Portuguese in our army, must have been falshoods, and falshoods, too, of a most cruel tendency as to the reputation of our own army.—There is another way, in which the press works against the army. We see everlastingly occurring accounts of the embarkation of "*troops to join Lord Wellington*." The public hear of this continually. One would imagine, that thousands go out to him every week. If the papers were looked over for the last year and a half, I am of opinion, that we should find accounts of 200,000 men having been sent out, to him. All men,

who reflect, must know that those accounts are false; but how many men are there who do reflect? Very few, indeed; and the general impression upon the public mind is, that a very *great army* has been sent out to him; and that, as they have always been "*in high health and spirits*," he must have a great army with him now.—But, if we were to look closely into the matter, we should find, that, in the accounts of embarkations, parties of recruits have been taken for battalions; and battalions for brigades; and, that the very same parties have been, under different dates and descriptions, mentioned several times over, and that thus every party has, at last, been multiplied by ten or twenty. A similar deception has been practised as to the sending out of stores and horses and provisions; and, as the reader must have perceived, the public have a thousand times been told of the *cheapness of provisions at Lisbon*, leaving it to be inferred, that *our army* had every thing in this way in *great abundance*.—Is it possible to form an idea of falshoods more injurious to the reputation of the whole of that army?—The truth is, that, though great reinforcements have been sent out, *great for us*, they have been, compared with the scale of the war and the force and reinforcements of the enemy, but very trifling. The government, I may be told, *have done all they can*. I do not doubt that; but, what is that to the fact? How can that lessen the injurious tendency of the flattering falshoods of the public prints? The climate of Portugal is unhealthy, more so for us than for the French, who are natives of a more Southern climate, whose habits, both as to diet and drink, expose them less to the ravages of fevers, and who are, moreover, enured to the labours and privations of war, and have been taught by long experience numerous precautions and timely remedies, which are far more powerful in keeping an army on foot than all the skill of a medical staff. Our men are more loaded with flesh, are fuller of blood, are greater eaters of animal food, drink a great deal more strong liquor. They have few of them ever before been under a burning sun; they have in general been unused to long and painful marches; they have not known what it is to seek their bed in the open air. Sickness seizes hold of them; and though their hearts do not fail them, their strength does. When they are got into battle there is no doubt

of them
tages, th
ficulty i
any thi
upon pu
have m
hoods, b
press ha
putation
press h
it had g
the ene
the pub
have ar
of the I
soldiers
artillery
lightnin
enginee
if it de
under
buoyan
through
walks c
of arm
perate
whose
soldier
if the
guage,
natives
with t
conduc
ently
receiv
raising
would
appoint
so vis
which
tions c
sentim
whole
there
not y
of wh
that i
war.
if it
other
pend
this
prod
quene
gethe
force
at la
the b
be th
dom.

of them; but, amidst all these disadvantages, there must necessarily be great difficulty in getting them there in numbers any thing nearly equal to their *numbers upon paper*.—Such are in part (for I have mentioned only a part) the falsehoods, by the means of which the venal press has laboured to the injury of the reputation of the whole army. Now, if that press had pursued a different course; if it had given a *true* account of the force of the enemy; if it had taken care to inform the public of the great reinforcements that have arrived from France; if it had spoken of the French as an army of experienced soldiers; if it had described the French artillery as served with the quickness of lightning; if it had spoken of the French engineers as men of incomparable skill; if it described all these means as placed under the direction of Generals whose buoyant genius had forced them upwards, through all obstacles, from the lowest walks of life, who have lived in the midst of armies and almost in the midst of desperate battles from their boyish days, and whose fortunate exploits have given their soldiers an habitual confidence in them: if the English press had held this language, and had besides, spoken of the natives of Portugal and their dispositions *with truth*; if this had been the line of conduct of the English press, how differently would the nation have felt upon receiving the news, the other day, of the raising of the siege of Rodrigo! There would, then, have been none of the disappointment and mortification, which was so visible upon every countenance, and which, in spite of all the after explanations of the press, could not fail to excite sentiments more or less injurious to the whole of the army in Portugal.—But, there is yet one light, in which we have not yet viewed the effect of “the stories,” of which we have been speaking; and that is with regard to the *final result of the war*. If the war should end in victory; if it should end, whether by a peace or otherwise, in rendering Portugal independent of the French; if it should end in this way, then the “stories,” will have produced, as to that end, no evil consequence; but, if the war should end altogether differently; if our army should be forced back to Lisbon, and be compelled, at last, to quit the country, leaving it in the hands of the French; what will then be the feeling of the people of this kingdom, after all the “stories” that they have

been told? I am not speaking here of the feeling as to the *Commander and the Army*; but, how will the people feel as to their own safety? After being so long told, that our army in Portugal was superior to the French in numbers; that it had plenty of all sorts of supplies, while the French were destitute of every thing; that it was in high health, while the French were wasting with sickness; that in all the inhabitants it had so many warm friends, while the French had in those inhabitants, so many bitter and implacable enemies: after being so long told all this, what must be the feelings of the people of England upon seeing the French become masters of Portugal? Will not their minds revert to their *own situation*? Will they not begin to think of the consequences of a possible invasion of England or Ireland? And will they not feel apprehensions, which they never would have felt, if the real state of the armies in Portugal had been fairly represented to them? I put these questions to the plain sense of the reader; and, I am persuaded, he will not fail to join me in reprobating the conduct of those, who have so long been endeavouring to keep the public in the dark as to the state of the contending armies in the peninsula.—The “stories” now complained of by the Commander himself, and which have been constantly reprobated by me, are said to tend to “*keep up the spirits of the people*,” and I have been accused of endeavouring “to damp their spirits.” But, who does them really the most service; those venal writers who deceive them and provide for them probable disappointment and mortification; or I, who tell them the truth, and who prepare them for those reverses which may probably happen?—For the last twenty years this nation has been the sport of unfounded hopes. It has been remarked, that no nation is more suddenly elated, or more suddenly depressed; that none is so prone to be elated in prosperity, or to despond in adversity; and, it must be confessed, that the publications from the venal press are admirably calculated to give its full force and most mischievous effect to this national propensity. In short, and this is my decided opinion, that this nation has not had, for the last twenty years, any enemy so successful as the unprincipled part of the press.—I shall now offer to the reader a few general reflections upon the war in Portugal.—It appears evident to me, as it long has, that it is the policy of

Napoleon not to put a speedy end to the war in Portugal, if he could. He is not a man to permit a war to linger, unless it suit his purpose so to do. He is not a man to permit his generals to hang off from fighting, having a force superior to the enemy. Marmont would not have dared to stop the pursuit of our army on this last occasion, if it had not been agreeable to the orders of his Master. The truth is, and, I think, it must be evident to every man of common sense, that Napoleon makes sure of Portugal, whenever he shall please to bend his whole force against it; and, this being the case, the longer he can make it convenient to keep the stroke suspended the better for him, because the more destructive to us.—It is said, that we *defend* Portugal; but, it is very clear, that we are unable to defend it any longer than the enemy refrains from attacking us; for, even those who talk of this *defence* of Portugal, admit now, that, if pushed by the French, our army must again retreat to its lines at the mouth of the Tagus.—The effect that such a movement would have upon the Portuguese need hardly be pointed out: it will suggest itself to every man capable of the smallest degree of reflection; and, it will manifestly be very different from what it was in the former instance.—The war is of that sort, that our means are not calculated to meet. We cannot send an army to the peninsula able to meet the armies that Napoleon can send thither, which has been proved by experience. Our general now tells us in so many words, that he has not forces fit to meet 60,000 French; and, if he has them not now, *when* is he to have them? It is generally thought, I believe, that the reinforcements, which are now sent out, do little more than *keep the numbers up*; and, as to the Portuguese, is there much prospect of their becoming any better than they are, or of their increasing in numbers? From what cause, then, is our force to be augmented? And, if it cannot be augmented, the point is set at rest at once, for our Commander himself says, that he could not, "without risking great loss," pretend to meet the French army that he saw opposed to him before Rodrigo. This, say the venal prints, was *true*; and, I have no doubt of the truth of it; for, putting myself, for a moment, in the place of our commander, I can easily determine that nothing but sheer necessity, nothing but a moral certainty of being beaten, and routed, could have induced him to

raise the blockade upon the approach of the French army. To raise a siege or a blockade is, in fact, a sort of defeat; it is what a general always yields to with great reluctance; and, we may be assured, that nothing short of a decided, an overwhelming superiority of numbers would have induced our army to raise the blockade of Rodrigo. That we are not, then, in a condition to meet the French now is clear. And *when* shall we be? again I ask. If ministers are able to send out troops sufficient to meet the French, why do they not send them? And, if they are not able to send out troops sufficient to meet the French, why do they persevere in the war, which, in this case, must be hopeless, though it costs the nation such immense sacrifices?—One would think, that the experience we have now had of the war in Portugal ought to be sufficient to convince such men as Captain Pasley, that continental war is not our element. In other countries we have complained, that our allies were cold; that the people were not with us. But, in this case, we have the government of the country pretty nearly in our own hands; we have the absolute command of the native troops as well as of our own; we put our own officers into the Portuguese corps; and we say, that the people of the country are all for us, and that they all hold the French in the greatest abhorrence. Well, we have been thus situated with regard to Portugal *three good long years*; and, what have we done? We and our enemy have made the country the theatre of a most destructive and devastating war; but that is all. We have not taken one jot from the power of Napoleon, in whose grand drama, the war in Portugal seems to be an insignificant underplot, though it be quite sufficient to drain England of her men and money; to exhaust, fatigue, and, if finally baffled, dishearten her.—What would I do, then? Would I recommend the *withdrawing of our army from Portugal*? I would. What! would I *abandon* the people of Portugal after having been in the country so long?—In answer to this I will not ask, whether the people of Portugal have any claim upon us; nor will I enter into an inquiry as to what would be the effect to them of the change. I shall suppose, that they have a great claim upon us, and that they would suffer from falling under the absolute sway of the French. But, then comes the question, are we *able* to defend Portugal, to *keep the French out of it* (for that

alone is worthy of the name of defence) for any length of time? Are we able *finally* to secure its independence of France? This last is the only question for us to determine; and, if we determine it in the negative; if we make up our minds to the point, that we are unable finally to secure the independence of Portugal, then it is clear that the sooner we quit the country, *the better it will be for the Portuguese.*—Then, as to *ourselves*, the longer we continue the war, the more we shall be exhausted by it; and, as to the effect upon our *spirits*, shall we not be more discouraged by a *forced* than by a *voluntary* relinquishment of Portugal?—There is one use, indeed, that might possibly be made of a longer possession of Portugal: I mean as *an item in negotiating for peace*; but, as peace seems to be thought of now by nobody, this is hardly worth mentioning; and, let it be observed, that unless we resolve to make no peace without stipulating for the independence of Portugal, it will be better to be out of it than in at the time of entering upon a negotiation; for, to *surrender* it to France as part of the price of advantages to ourselves, would be an everlasting stain upon our character.—Such are my reasons against a further continuation of the war in Portugal; and, until they are shewn to be wrong; until they meet with something better than abusive reproach and vile insinuation by way of answer, I shall be perverse enough to think them unanswerable.

MALTA.—This Island, which was, at first, the ostensible object of the present war, seems to have almost wholly dropped out of sight. There is, however, apparently, something now going on there well worthy of the public attention. Many of the principal people have drawn up and signed a *Petition* to the Governor, GENERAL OAKES, which he has expressed his disapprobation of in a *Proclamation*. I subjoin both documents. The *Petition* was, it seems, signed by many more persons than those whose names are here put to it.—As to the merits of the case, I am not well enough acquainted with the state of the Island to say much about it; and I must, therefore, for the present at least, leave both documents to speak for themselves.—It is, however, a matter of some consequence, that this Island, so near to Sicily, should, at this moment, be agitated with any serious contest between the government and the people; and, it

certainly makes an important point in our affairs in the Mediterranean, where they were already in a very critical state. The Mediterranean is become a scene of great interest. The enemy are in great force upon its borders. We command the islands; but, our expence is enormous, while that of the enemy, who is *at home*, is very trifling indeed. The loss we sustain by the exchange of money is immense; and, yet, are there men, who, like Captain Pasley, are eager for an extension of our foreign expeditions and wars!

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
25th October, 1811.*

MALTESE PETITION.

To His Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland in Council.

Humbly supplicate,

We native Maltese, faithful subjects of your Majesty our elected and benign Sovereign, pushed on by the many facts that has occurred in these islands of Malta and Gozzo for the last ten years, totally opposite to that high idea which public fame, and the experience given us during the blockade of Valletta, made us conceive of the English nation, and induces us to take the boldness to humble, at the throne of your Majesty, what follows:—That rare confidence and total submission with which the Maltese shewed an inviolable attachment to the British government, remitting entirely their affairs to the disposition of your Majesty's officers, notwithstanding the full authority residing with the Maltese, gave them the strongest motives to hope an amicable correspondence. The Maltese nevertheless see themselves deluded in their hopes, and see that, from a sordid policy, their most sacred rights and greatest interests are unjustly sacrificed, and, without necessity, by an abusive capitulation, stipulated by the officers of your Majesty with the French garrison, without the least participation with the Maltese, at the expence of our substance constrained to lay down our arms in the country, when our enemies surrendered their's in the cities given up. We saw with the most sensible displeasure those our enemies, under our very eyes, loaded with the spoils of our nation, vaulting with pride at the universal desolation, after the nation, for the space of two years, had

suffered mortality, hunger, affliction, and unspeakable fatigue under the walls of Valletta. The privileges of the council, after giving up the city, was immediately suspended and suppressed; though, by the flattering promises of sir Alex. Ball to the representatives, in future to reunite them in case of need, increased the unhappiness of our condition. We then began to feel the fatal effects of the suppression of a people the most honest and considerable of the place. Violence in taking from the magistrates the free exercise of their jurisdiction, and removing the whole body at the sole caprice of Ball, without any formality of justice; deputations formed of very few people, amongst whom were likewise strangers put in to answer private objects, without the least formality or legality, and given to the press under the name of the nation, with the approbation of some late commissaries occupying public places set apart for the exercise of pity and commiseration; seizure of the youth, sprung from our remotest forefathers, with insult and grievance. The distance of your Majesty, and fear of the despotical Ball, has impeded, for a length of time, the present claims.—There are those who tax the faithful Maltese with unquietness as a people, which is a false imputation. Our patience, submission, and faith in the justice of your Majesty, during ten years, gives to our faith very strong arguments of facts, and not of words, which is fully sufficient to confound our calumniators.—Finally, many other facts of injustice upon which our prudence imposes silence, the which in a small part exist with one elected agent, Giovanni Ricarde, which form our utmost misfortunes, and justify enough our suspicions, and leave us without much confidence with regard to the future.—To dissipate then our fears, to increase always more those ties of attachment of our countrymen in a manner inseparable from the crown of your Majesty, we address ourselves to the same source, to have in consideration the state in which we find ourselves, and to turn a benign eye to our supplications, so that at last we may obtain the many times promised restitution of our ancient rights, to fill the hearts of a sincere people with gratitude, fidelity, and love. And your Majesty will have a people the most faithful and attached towards your Majesty's crown, and to defend our islands.—These supplications are reduced in general terms to the restitution

of our ancient sacred rights, violated by the last grand master of the order of St. John, enjoyed by us during the blockade of Valletta, expressly stipulated when we consigned our islands with unlimited faith to the officers of your Majesty, and taken from us by the *defunct* sir A. Ball, and newly solemnly promised us in the name of your Majesty by sir Charles Cameron.—The principal of these our rights is a free representation of the people, otherwise a popular council, with the right to send deputed memorials to your Majesty in council, when they are found to be lawful.

2d. Independent tribunals.

3d. Liberty of the Press; but not licence in things that might offend our Catholic Religion.

4th. A Jury in the manner in use in England, or according to our antient usage, with the right to appeal in every case from the sentence of the judge to the popular council.

5th. In fine, a Constitution wherein may enter the spirit of our free and legitimate Government with that of the Constitution of England, saving always our Catholic Religion.

To obtain our antient rights, we have acclaimed your Majesty for our Sovereign; we therefore supplicate in the name of justice, of all laws divine and human, and for the loss of about twenty thousand men, and for our sufferings in all the time of the blockade, that the restitution of our rights and privileges, for which the Maltese have been authorized by their antient sovereigns to give their consent in whatever change of government, which consent cannot be neglected without offence to justice. And which we do not expect from the just government of your Majesty, who was elected by our hearts.—The Maltese have recourse to your Majesty as in duty bound, and will never cease to supplicate and protest themselves faithful.

The underwritten,

Barone Vincenzo Azopardi,
Cavaliere Paolo Parisi,
Emico Testaferrata,
Gio Batta Cassar Desain,
Conte Ferdinando Teuma,
Marchesi Saverio Alessi,
D. Mario Testaferrata,
Nicolo Marchesi di Testaferrata,
D. Gregorio Augusto Testaferrata,
Conte Martino Preziosi,
Conte Gio Dr. Fenma Castelletti,
Daniele Bonnici,



Dr. Elias Vella,
 Vincenzo Alessi,
 Marchese Gio Ant. Apase,
 Pietro Paolo Bonnici,
 Dr. Francesco Alessi,
 F. Guis. Imbrol, for Pandolfo, de-
 prived of sight,
 Gio Batta Bonnici Monpalaco,
 Guiseppe Gatt,
 Vincenzo Veila,
 Antonio Gallea,
 Luigi de Conti Teuma Catelletta,
 Vincenzo Borg,
 Dr. Tisico Gio Batta Falzon,
 Salvatore Elled,
 Sac Ant. Darmanin,
 Sar Franc. Seychet,
 Antonio Gallea,
 Chirurgo Gio Falson,
 Baldassare Lamotta,
 Franc. Farrugia,
 Guisc. Cilia,
 Franc. Borg,
 Antonio Parnis,
 Guisc. Erima,
 Franc. Russo,
 Antonio Manguir,
 Pietro Mallia Sacerdote,
 Gio Batta Lasperanza,
 Cancelliere Gio Franc. Bonella,
 Con Salvatore Corso,
 Salva. Xeri Can Cantone,
 Aloisio Xuere,
 Guis. Farrugia,
 Ant. Alra,
 Paolo Ealea Neg.
 Ignazio Falson,
 Nicola Ciantar,
 Francesco Cacuana,
 Calcedonio Pace,
 Guis. Xichina,
 Salvatore Pace.

The foregoing is faithfully translated
 from an authenticated copy, extracted
 from its original in the Italian language.
Malta, August, 1811.

PROCLAMATION

By the Governor of Malta.

The King's Civil Commissioner observes
 with regret, that some weak and inconsiderate
 persons, deceived under specious
 pretexts, have suffered themselves to be-
 come the instruments of a few turbulent
 and factious individuals. They have been
 seduced to subscribe a paper, purporting to
 be an Application to the King for certain
 changes in the existing form of the Go-
 vernment of these Islands, but which is in

fact a scandalous libel upon that Govern-
 ment, as hitherto administered, and the
 vehicle of private malignity.—The acts of
 His Majesty's former Representatives are
 grossly and insidiously perverted; facts
 are misrepresented; and the revered me-
 mory of one, whose long administration,
 marked as it was by wisdom and mildness,
 and by the most distinguished benefits to
 these Islands, had been sanctioned by the
 gracious approbation of his Sovereign, is
 ungratefully and vindictively traduced by
 an unfeeling and disappointed faction.—
 Whilst His Excellency feels himself called
 upon thus to animadvert upon a proceed-
 ing no less dishonourable to the parties
 concerned, than it is disrespectful to the
 Government, he reflects with peculiar sa-
 tisfaction that so small a number of indi-
 viduals, and of those so very few of any
 respectability, have been seduced by the
 insidious arts so long and so industriously
 practised to mislead them. This conside-
 ration, added to the well-grounded confi-
 dence which the King's Civil Commis-
 sioner reposes in the loyalty and attach-
 ment of the Maltese at large, whose happi-
 ness has long been dear to him, and whose
 real interests His Excellency shall ever be
 solicitous to promote, enables him to exer-
 cise more generally towards a misguided
 few, the lenity, and forbearance, which
 have ever characterised His Majesty's Go-
 vernment in these Islands. Few, indeed,
 and prejudiced, must those Maltese be, who
 are insensible to the superior advantages
 they possess under the auspices of Great
 Britain; but if such there are, let them
 learn from the victims of French oppres-
 sion who daily crowd to these shores, as to
 an envied asylum, how they ought to
 appreciate the prosperity and security
 which, under the powerful protection of
 His Majesty's Fleets and Armies, they
 so liberally enjoy.—If His Excellency has
 hitherto delayed publicly to notice this
 extraordinary memorial, he has been
 actuated by the desire of affording to those
 who might have been deceived, an oppor-
 tunity of acknowledging their error; and
 several have accordingly come forward
 and avowed, in writing, the gross delusion
 under which their subscriptions were ob-
 tained to the document, and their total ig-
 norance of its contents.—The Paper in
 question, such as it is, His Excellency is
 determined to transmit by the first oppor-
 tunity to His Majesty's Ministers.

By Command of his Excellency,

F. LAING, Acting Public Secretary.
 Palace, 23d August, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL. — (*Copied from the Times newspaper of the 21st Oct. 1811.*) —

The following is given as a copy of a letter intended to have been circulated by Lord Wellington among the Officers of the army under his command, but which circulation, from some unexplained cause, was not carried into effect.

Villa Formosa, May 15.

SIR ;—Adverting to your report of the transactions of the morning of the 31st ult. in pursuit of the garrison of Almeida, I have to state, that nothing has given me more concern than the conduct of the hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane, of the 36th regiment. When the enemy had passed the bridge of Barba del Porco, the farther pursuit of those troops was useless ; and every step taken beyond the point to which the Lieutenant-Colonel was ordered to proceed, was only a risk to the officers and soldiers under his command, from whence retreat was next to impossible.—The Lieutenant-Colonel did not know possibly, that the whole of the 2d corps d'Armée was at St. Felices, but a short distance from Barba del Porco ; and, upon hearing the firing, formed on the Agueda to protect the retreat of these troops ; he knew, however, that the garrison of Almeida, although perhaps in disorder, were a body far superior in numbers to those he had under his command ; and he did not know what troops were in St. Felices to support them :—his advance, therefore, and his passage of the bridge, was an imprudence, to which all the losses of the day must be attributed.—The frequent instances that occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failures, by Officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they were ordered, and beyond all bounds ; such as the loss of prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 3d and 5th ; the loss incurred by the 13th Light Dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on the 25th of March ; the severe loss incurred by the troops at the siege of Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 10th inst. have induced me to determine to bring before a General Court-martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who should in future be guilty of this conduct.—I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy ; but it is my duty,

and that of every General and other Officer in command, to emulate the spirit, and not to expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers in situations where they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they run the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten.—The desire of being forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army ; but that quality which I wish to see the Officers possess, who are at the head of troops, is a cool discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety, and to convey their orders, and to act with such vigour and decision as that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity. The officers of the army may depend upon it, that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large ; nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.—I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to circulate to General Officers of Divisions, with directions to circulate it among the officers of the army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to avoid the crime which is the subject of it, and which is really become of serious detriment to the army and public interest.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

PORTUGAL.—*Dispatches from Lord Wellington, published in London 16th Oct. 1811.*

Dispatches, of which the following are a Copy and an Extract, were yesterday evening received at the Earl of Liverpool's Office, addressed to his Lordship by General Viscount Wellington, dated Quadrasyes, 29th September, and Frexada, 2d October, 1811.

Quadrasyes, Sept. 29, 1811.

MY LORD,—The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar and from Salamanca on the 21st inst. and on the following day I collected the British army, in positions from which

I could either advance or retire without difficulty, which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy's army.—The 3d division, and that part of the General Alten's brigade of cavalry which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Agueda, having their advanced guard, under Lieutenant Colonel Williams of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo; the 4th division were at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works; the light division on the right of the Agueda, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castile and Estremadura; Lieutenant-General Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava; the 6th division and Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry being at Espeja, and occupying Carpio Marialva, &c.—Mareschal del Campo Don Carlos D'Espagne observed the Lower Agueda with Don Julian Sanchez's cavalry and infantry. Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Major-General Slade's and Major-General De Grey's brigades of cavalry, was on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with General Pack's brigade at Campillo; and the 5th division were in observation of the pass of Perales in the rear of the right, the French General Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the Army of Portugal, and a division of the Army of the Centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.—The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23d, and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain, by the roads of St. Spiritus and Tenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about six thousand men, and four divisions of infantry, of which one division were of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.—On the morning of the 25th, the enemy sent a reconnoissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about fourteen squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard.—They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava; but having passed that river, the

Lanciers de Berg were charged by two squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regiment, which had been posted in the wood, on their flank, by Lieutenant-General Graham; and Major-General Anson pursued them across the Azava, and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieutenant-General Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major-General Anson's brigade; and Major-General Anson particularly mentions Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey and Captain Brotherton of the 14th, and Captain Hay and Major Cocks of the 16th.—But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3d division on the hills between Fuente Guinaldo, and Pastores. About eight in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 battalions of infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, in such a direction, as that it was doubtful whether they would attempt to ascend the hills by Encina El Bodon, or by the direct road towards Fuente Guinaldo, and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.—As soon as I saw the directions of their march, I had reinforced the 2d battalion 5th regiment, which occupied the post on the hill, over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regiment, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, and Major-General Alten's Brigade, of which only three squadrons remained, which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon the remainder of the troops of the 3d division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.—In the mean time, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the second battalion 5th regiment, under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately re-taken.—While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regi-

ment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regiment, and the three squadrons of Major General Alten's brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy, which ascended the hill, on the left of the two regiments of British infantry; the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of the right.—At length the division of the enemy's infantry, which had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2d battalion 5th regiment, and the 77th regiment, were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another, supported by Major-General Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.—The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regiments were charged on three faces of the square by the French cavalry; but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the third division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo; and the whole retired together in the utmost order; and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following them.—Lieutenant-Colonel Williams with his light infantry, and the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Trench, with the 74th regiment, retired from Pastores across the Agueda, and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and re-crossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.—I placed the third and fourth divisions, and General Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major-General Alten's, Major-General De Grey's, and Major-General Slade's brigades of cavalry, in the position of Fuente Guinaldo, on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major-General Crawford to retire with the light division across the Agueda; the seventh division to form at Albergaria, and Lieutenant-General Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the troops were thus formed in an

echelon, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo; and the right upon the Pass of Perales, and the left at Nave d'Aver. Mareschal del Campo Don Carlos d'Espagne was placed on the left of the Coa, and Don Julian Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.—The enemy brought up a 2d division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo, in the afternoon of the 25th, and, in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about three leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: the 5th division on the right, at Aldea Velha: the 4th, and light divisions, and Maj. Gen. Alten's cavalry, at the Convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfayates; the 2d and 7th divisions, in second line, behind Alfayates; and Lieut. General Graham's corps on the left at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villa Maior River, and Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry near Alfayates, on the left of the 4th division, and having General Pack's and General M'Mahon's brigades, at Nebulosa, on their left. The piquets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea de Ponte, beyond the Villa Maior River; and those of General Alten's brigade beyond the same river towards Furcalhos.—It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergaria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Furcalhos. The former attacked the piquets of the cavalry at Aldea de Ponte, and drove them in; and they pushed on nearly as far as Alfayates. I then made General Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by the Honourable Lieutenant-General Cole, and the 4th division; and by Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry; and the enemy were driven through Aldea de Ponte, back upon Albergaria, and the piquets of the cavalry resumed their station.—But the enemy having been reinforced by the troops which marched upon Furcalhos, again advanced about sun-set, and drove in the piquets of the cavalry from Aldea de Ponte; and took possession of the village.—Lieutenant-General

Cole again
General
them thro
come on
not certa
or of the
knew tha
farther, h
enemy o
—On th
heights
Mesas o
the Coa,
the posit
the 27th
Aldea d
posts at
they ar
the cour
some ba
at the p
propose
conclud
the last
Lordshi
the troo
instant.
5th reg
in parti
ple of
of the t
officers
and try
77th r
Lieuten
good, s
termin
whole
advant
artiller
battali
the go
of the
comm
Arent
infanti
were
shewe
both i
to rec
ments
plain,
tillery
tache
ment
down
this o
Majo
ville
ing

Cole again attacked them with a part of General Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village, but night having come on, and as General Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy, and he knew that the army were to fall back still farther, he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied, and held during the night.—On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito, having the Sierra das Mesas on the right, and the left Reudo on the Coa, about one league in the rear of the position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea de Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergaria; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gale, I propose to canton the troops.—I cannot conclude this Report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affair of the 25th instant.—The conduct of the 2d battalion 5th regiment, commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect, in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these two weak battalions.—I must not omit also to report the good conduct on the same occasions, of the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Col. Bacellar, and of Major Arentchildt's artillery.—The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened; and they shewed the utmost steadiness and discipline both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over six miles of plain, in front of superior cavalry and artillery.—The Portuguese artillery-men attached to the guns, which were for a moment in the enemy's possession, were cut down at their guns.—The infantry, upon this occasion, were under the command of Major-General the Honourable C. Colville; Lieutenant-General Picton having remained with the troops at El

Bodon; and the conduct of Major-General Colville was beyond all praise.—Your Lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st Hussars and 11th Light Dragoons, of Major General Alten's Brigade. There were not more than three squadrons of the two regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the out-posts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained, if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of those brave men, by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of fourteen battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive.—Major General Alten, and Lieutenant Colonels Cumming and Arentchildt, and the Officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion.—I have also to mention, that the Adjutant-General, Major-General the Honourable C. Stewart, being upon the field, gave his assistance as an Officer of Cavalry, with his usual gallantry.—In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea de Ponte, Brigadier-General Pakenham, and the troops of the fourth division, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.—His Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship, and was for the first time in fire, and he conducted himself with the spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament of his profession.—The enemy having collected, for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, the Army of the North, which were withdrawn from the attack which they commenced on General Abadia, in Galicia, in which are included 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard, and General Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the Army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontiers of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with five divisions, and all the cavalry of the army called of Portugal, composing altogether an army of not less than sixty thousand men, of which six thou-

sand were cavalry, and 125 pieces of artillery; I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any efforts which I could make, prevent, or materially impede the collection of the supplies, or the march of the convoy for the relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object, and as the reports, as usual, were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army.—I have had no reports from the North since I addressed your Lordship last, nor from the South of Spain.—General Girard had collected at Merida, a small body of troops; but I imagine that he will break up this collection again, as soon as he will hear that General Hill is at Portalegre.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) WELLINGTON.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, on the 25th and 27th instant.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, under the Command of his Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in an Affair with the Enemy, on the 25th of September, 1811, on the Heights of El Bodon.

11th Light Dragoons—8 rank and file, 12 horses, killed; 1 Lieut.-Colonel, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Quarter-Master, 3 Serjeants, 10 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded.

14th ditto—1 Lieutenant, 2 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

16th ditto—2 horses killed; 1 Serjeant, 7 rank and file, 1 horse wounded; 1 rank and file, 2 horses, missing.

1st Hussars, King's German Legion—1 Serjeant, 4 rank and file, 23 horses, killed; 2 Captains, 4 Serjeants, 1 Trumpeter, 27 rank and file, 29 horses, wounded; 5 rank and file, missing.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—5 rank and file killed; 1 Captain, 1 Serjeant, 12 rank and file, wounded.

1st Batt. 45th Foot—1 Serjeant missing.

77th Foot—4 rank and file killed; 14 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.

2d Batt. 83d Foot—5 rank and file killed; 1 Serjeant, 13 rank and file wounded; 1 drummer, 4 rank and file, missing.

1st Batt. 88th foot—5 rank and file missing.

94th Foot—1 rank and file missing.

Total British loss—1 Serjeant, 26 rank and file, 37 horses killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1

Quarter-Master, 10 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 85 rank and file, 49 horses, wounded; 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 21 rank and file, 3 horses, missing.

Total Portuguese loss—1 rank and file killed; 5 rank and file wounded; 1 Drummer, 1 rank and file, missing.

General total—1 Serjeant, 27 rank and file, 37 horses, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Quarter-Master, 10 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 90 rank and file, 49 horses, wounded; 1 Serjeant, 2 Drummers, 22 rank and file, 3 horses, missing.

N. B. The 14th and 16th Light Dragoons engaged near Espeja, on the left of the army. (Signed) CHARLES STEWART,

Maj. General and Adj.-General.

List of Officers wounded on the 25th of September, 1811.

11th Light Dragoons—Lieut.-Col. Cummings, slightly; Lieut. King, severely.

14th ditto—Lieut. Hall, slightly.

1st Hussars, King's German Legion—Captains Burgman and Poten, severely.

2d Batt. 5th Foot—Capt. Ramus, slightly.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of his Excellency Gen. Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. in an Affair with the Enemy, near Aldea de Ponte, on the 27th of September, 1811.

Royal Horse Artillery—1 Lieutenant, wounded.

3d Dragoon Guards—4 horses, wounded.

1st or Royal Dragoons—1 horse, killed; 3 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

4th Dragoons—1 horse, missing.

12th Light Dragoons—2 horses, killed; 2 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded; 4 rank and file, 4 horses, missing.

1st Batt. 7th Fusileers—9 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant, 28 rank and file, wounded.

1st Batt. 23d Foot—1 Captain, 2 rank and file, killed; 1 Major, 1 Captain, 13 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file, missing.

1st Batt. 48th ditto—1 Captain, 1 Serjeant, 1 Drummer, 5 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.

5th Batt. 60th ditto (1 Company attached to the Hon. Major-Gen. Cole)—1 Captain, wounded.

Light Infantry Brunswick Oels (1 Company attached to 4th Division of Infantry)—1 rank and file, killed; 3 rank and file, wounded.

Total B
and file, 3
tains, 4 Li
mer, 54 ra
s rank and
Total
killed;
wounded
Total g
and file, 3
tains, 4 L
mer, 64 r
9 rank and
N. B.
the 18th
Major-Ge
supposed

Return of

Killed.
Courtlan
Wound
Lieut. D
7th F
Lieuts.
slightly
23d
nant-Co
severely
1st B
slightly
5th
severely

Since
Septem
retired
the Ar
and it
of Por
—Gira
I infor
lected
and ha
bourne
Gener
Zarza
with
Army
Place

Sp

2.
to ret

[541]

Total British loss—1 Captain, 12 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 Major, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 54 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded; 8 rank and file, 6 horses, missing.

Total Portuguese loss—1 rank and file, killed; 1 Serjeant, 10 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file, missing.

Total general loss—1 Captain, 13 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 Major, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 3 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 64 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded; 9 rank and file, 6 horses, missing.

N.B. One Serjeant and one Horse of the 18th Hussars (Orderly to the Hon. Major-General Charles Stewart), missing, supposed to be taken prisoner.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Maj.-General and Adj.-General.

Return of Officers killed and wounded, on the 27th of September, 1811.

Killed.—1st Batt. 23d Foot—Capt. C. Courtland.

Wounded.—Royal Horse Artillery—Lieut. Dunn, severely, not dangerously.

7th Fusileers—Capt. Willy, severely; Lieuts. Seton, Wallace, and Barrington, slightly.

23d Foot—Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson and Captain Payne, severely.

1st Batt. 48th Foot—Capt. Turnpenny, slightly.

5th Batt. 60th ditto—Captain Prevost, severely.

Frexada, October 2, 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 29th of September, I have learned that the enemy retired from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the Army of the North towards Salamanca, and it is said, Valladolid; and the Army of Portugal towards Banos and Placentia. —Girard's division of the 5th corps, which I informed your Lordship had been collected at Merida, has retired from thence, and has again been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Zafra.—I likewise learn that General Foy, who had advanced as far as Zarza Major, in the valley of the Allegon, with his own division, and one of the Army of the Centre, has retired towards Placentia.

SPAIN.—*Head Quarters at Valladolid.*

(Concluded from page 480.)

Ordinance.

2. All such individuals shall be bound to return to their homes in the course of

one month, in default of which, they shall be considered as forming part of the bands of insurgents, and all their property shall be confiscated; all persons owing them rents, and their debtors of every description whatever, are forbidden to make their payments in any other way but into the hands of the administrators of the national domains.

3. The fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews of such individuals are declared responsible, both in their property and in their persons, for every act of spoliation committed by the insurgents upon peaceable citizens, or upon their property.

4. If any inhabitant is carried off from his home, three of the nearest relatives of a brigand shall be immediately arrested, to serve as hostages; if this individual is put to death by the bands, the hostages shall be shot immediately; and without any form of process.

5. Every person who shall absent himself from his township, for more than eight days, (to commence from the publication of the present ordinance), without permission, shall be considered as having gone over to the bands; all his property shall be sequestrated, and sold after the expiration of three months; all his relatives within the degrees mentioned in the 3d Article shall be put under arrest.

6. No inhabitant can remove from his township, without being provided with a passport, which shall be given him for a limited time. This passport shall only be given upon the certificate of two resident householders in the township, who shall be sureties, that at the expiration of the time mentioned in the passport, he who is the bearer shall have returned to his township, or shall have shewn that he resided in places occupied by the French army. In failure of which, the two sureties shall be arrested, and put in prison.

7. Every inhabitant of towns where there is a Commissary of Police, shall provide himself with a card of security.

8. Domiciliary visits shall be made, in pursuance of the orders of Commandants of Towns, at periods which they shall deem proper: every individual unprovided with a card of security, shall be immediately arrested, and sent to prison; the public functionaries alone are excepted from this order.

9. In like manner those shall be arrested who have given an asylum to any individual unprovided with a passport or card of security.

10. Whoever shall be convicted of having held correspondence with the brigands, shall be punished with death.

11. All correspondence with the inhabitants of districts occupied by insurgents is prohibited; those who receive letters from such districts must give them to the Commandants of towns, or to Commissioners of Police, where there are such.

12. Infractions of the preceding article shall be punished with ten years imprisonment.

13. The Governors-General of the different Governments, and the Intendant-General, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present ordinance, which shall be printed, published, and fixed up in all the usual places.

(Signed) Marshal, Duke of ISTRIA.
By his Excellency the General in Chief.

(Signed) DE BROGLIE,
Auditor of the Council of State, Secretary-General of the Government.

Head Quarters at Valladolid, June 5.

General Orders.

It is ordered that all the Magistrates and Alcaldes of towns that are within four leagues distance of any fortress or post occupied by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor and King, do give immediate information of the movement or halt of any parties of brigands within their district, to the nearest French Commandants, and this under pain of military execution.—It is also ordered, that the Alcaldes and Magistrates of towns and villages do give information to every French detachment on its march on the high road, of all the concealed positions which the parties of brigands may have formed within their district.—Whenever a detachment of troops is attacked on the road, and the inhabitants of the town upon whose territory the attack took place have not given information of the concealed post or ambuscade to the Commander of the detachment, the town shall be given up to pillage, and the most culpable inhabitants shall be arrested, and delivered over to a Military Commission; and in case of any repetition of the same circumstance the town shall be burnt.—The ringing of bells on the approach of French troops is prohibited. The person who gives or executes orders for ringing of bells on such

occasions shall be shot.—The present orders shall be printed, and posted up on the principal gate of the churches of all the towns.—The Military Chiefs and Commandants of Fortresses are especially charged with the execution of these orders.—By command of Marshal the Duke of Istria, General in Chief of the army of the North of Spain.

Baron LECAMUS, Chief of the Staff.

THE BANK MEETING.

September 19, 1811.

To day a Half Yearly Meeting of the Proprietors of Bank Stock was held, when Mr. CLIFFORD rose and made a variety of observations for the purpose of shewing that the extraordinary profits recently made, entitled the Proprietors to an increase of 5 per cent. on the present dividend. The dividend of 10 per cent. was now, by the *depreciation of paper*, of much less real amount than at the period when it was first declared. In justice to the Proprietors, therefore, the addition was imperiously called for, as well as upon the ground of the great augmentation of the profits upon all the different concerns of the Bank. He was prepared to shew that there was a large excess in the hands of the Directors, which he conceived ought to be divided among the Proprietors. Mr. CLIFFORD then entered into a statement of the sums derived by the Bank upon the various items of the rise in the nominal value of the dollar token, the charges for managing the national debt, the profits on dead stock, lottery prizes, unclaimed dividends, &c. which he stated to be on the average, since 1806, 702,401*l.* a year. He then contended at considerable length, that the issue of notes had been excessive, and that until reduced, it would be unavailing to issue silver tokens, since the growing depreciation would always destroy the equilibrium between them and the paper, and the evil now so generally felt and complained of, the want of small change, must remain incurable. The emission of every single additional note operated to raise the price of bullion, and of all the necessaries of life.—The price of the quartern loaf was now 16*d.*

(To be continued.)